12Energy & Industry · Data brief

Energy security after the break with Russia

In 2021 Russia supplied more than half of Germany's gas imports. By 2025 Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium and LNG had taken its place. Katherina Reiche took office with the emergency phase over and a new set of questions in front of her: how full the storage sites should be, who pays for a reserve, how much controllable power the system needs – and, from March 2026, how to respond to an oil and gas price shock from the Gulf.

Gas imports 20251,031 TWh
LNG share10.3%
Storage, 26 Sep 202657.4%
Katherina Reiche standing with IEA Executive Director Fatih Birol in front of the ministry backdrop, with German and EU flags
Katherina Reiche with Fatih Birol, Executive Director of the International Energy Agency, in front of the ministry backdrop.
The shift

From one dominant supplier to four routes

Germany's import structure, 2021 against 2025. The 2021 figure comes from a secondary source; the 2025 figures are from the Bundesnetzagentur.

2021 ~55%

Approximate share of German gas imports supplied by Russia (World Economic Forum, 2022; a primary BNetzA or ministry figure would be preferable).

2025 44% Norway

Largest single source of 1,031 TWh of imports. Pipeline gas from the Netherlands and Belgium follows; LNG through German terminals adds 10.3%.

864TWh

Gas consumption in Germany, 2025 (+2.2%).

BNetzA, Jan 2026
221TWh

Gas exported onwards to neighbouring countries, 2025.

BNetzA, Jan 2026
34TWh

Domestic gas production, 2025 – about 4% of consumption.

BNetzA, Jan 2026
94.7%

Share of LNG landed in Germany that came from the US, January–November 2025.

Reported via Yahoo News, 2025
Imports 2025

Where the gas comes from

Pipeline imports from three north-west European neighbours make up almost nine-tenths of the total. The LNG figure counts only cargoes landed at German terminals.

The domestic-production share (34 of 864 TWh) is our own calculation from BNetzA figures.

Norway44%
Netherlands24%
Belgium21%
LNG (German terminals)10.3%

Share of total imports of 1,031 TWh, 2025. Scale 0–100%. Source: Bundesnetzagentur, 12 January 2026. Remaining small flows not shown.

Germany's LNG import terminals
SiteTypeStatus
Wilhelmshaven 1Floating storage and regasification unit (FSRU)In operation since 2022
Wilhelmshaven 2FSRUCommercial operation from 29 August 2025
BrunsbüttelFSRUIn operation since January 2023
LubminTerminal named in BNetzA import dataDelivered LNG in 2025
Mukran (Rügen)Terminal named in BNetzA import dataDelivered LNG in 2025
StadeLand-based, ammonia-readyPlanned for 2027

Sources: Bundesnetzagentur (2025 import data); Gas Processing News, October 2025.

Analysis Diversification has removed the single-supplier risk of 2021, but it has created new dependencies. Norway is now the anchor supplier, and almost all LNG landed in Germany in 2025 came from one country, the United States. Exposure has moved from one geopolitical relationship to a market in which prices are set globally – a point the 2026 Gulf crisis made plain.

Storage & reserve

Storage rules, a low fill level and a planned reserve

Storage is Germany's buffer for winter. Under Reiche the rules were loosened in 2025, and in 2026 the government announced a state-owned reserve.

Gas storage fill level, 26 September 2026

About 19 percentage points below the same day in 2025. Sources: cleanthinking.de; t-online.

Verified fact The Gas Storage Fill Level Ordinance of May 2025 relaxed the 1 November target from 90 per cent to 80 per cent per facility, with 45 per cent for six designated sites and an overall target of 70 per cent.

Verified fact The government plans a state-owned strategic gas reserve of about 24 TWh, to be built up from 2027. The storage operators' association INES had recommended 78 TWh. On financing, Reiche named two routes:

"One option is a levy, the other is financing from the budget."

„Das eine ist eine Umlage, das zweite ist die Haushaltsfinanzierung.“

Katherina Reiche on the strategic gas reserve, summer 2026 (cleanthinking.de)
Old target
90% by 1 November
New target
80% per facility; 45% at six sites; 70% overall
Gas storage levy
Abolished from 1 January 2026
Planned reserve
~24 TWh, state-owned, from 2027
INES proposal
78 TWh
Analysis

Lower targets reduce the volumes that must be bought and stored over the summer, and with them the cost. The trade-off is a thinner buffer. Abolishing the storage levy also removed one source of funding just as the question of who pays for a reserve arose. The planned reserve is less than a third of what the storage industry asked for.

Supply decisions

Borkum and the EU ban on Russian gas

Verified fact On 2 July 2025 the cabinet approved a unitisation agreement with the Netherlands. It lets the Dutch company One-Dyas produce gas from the German side of a cross-border field off Borkum, near the Wadden Sea. The Bundestag's economic affairs committee held a public hearing on 25 February 2026. Whether the agreement has since been ratified could not be confirmed.

Criticism Deutsche Umwelthilfe calls the agreement contrary to EU law.

Analysis Domestic production is small – 34 TWh in 2025 – so Borkum is less a volume question than a signal: the government is willing to support new fossil gas production close to home while imports from Russia are phased out by law.

EU regulation ending Russian gas imports
DateStep
26 Jan 2026Final approval by the Council
3 Feb 2026Regulation in force (published 2 Feb)
25 Apr 2026Ban on short-term LNG contracts
17 Jun 2026Ban on short-term pipeline contracts
1 Jan 2027Ban on long-term LNG contracts
30 Sep 2027Ban on long-term pipeline contracts (extendable to 31 Oct 2027 if storage is low)

Sources: European Parliament Legislative Observatory; CMS; Ukrainska Pravda.

Power-system security

Dunkelflaute and controllable capacity

Reiche's case for new gas plants rests on periods of little wind and sun. How long such periods last is disputed.

Her argument

"As a former energy manager I can tell you that dark doldrums without wind and solar can last not just a few days but often weeks."

Katherina Reiche in an NZZ interview, spring 2025, as reported by heidelberg24. Paraphrase-grade: the wording comes from a secondary source.

The fact check

The same report cites the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT): the longest "Dunkelflaute" since 1982 lasted 11 days, in November 2024. A period of 11 days is long enough to require substantial back-up, but it is not "often weeks".

Verified fact The policy response is the Electricity Supply Security and Capacity Act (StromVKG), passed by the Bundestag on 9 July 2026. It provides for 12 GW of additional controllable capacity from hydrogen-ready plants, storage and flexible loads, followed by a technology-neutral capacity market from 2032. The first 4.5 GW auction closed on 8 September 2026 and was significantly oversubscribed; awards are due by 3 November 2026.

Analysis Even on KIT's shorter estimate, a power system that relies mainly on wind and solar needs firm capacity for days at a time. The dispute is less about whether back-up is needed than about how much, which technology – gas plants, batteries or demand flexibility – and at whose cost. The April 2026 reports that the ministry had asked EnBW for arguments against battery storage made that question politically sensitive. Markets and auctions · H2-ready plants

Crisis 2026

The Hormuz shock and the fuel measures

The war involving Iran, the United States and Israel, from late February or early March 2026, led to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

~118$/bbl

Peak Brent crude price, late March 2026.

Euronews; Wikipedia summary, 2026
~60%

Rise in European gas prices during the shock.

Euronews, 22 Mar 2026
2.50€/l

Record diesel price on 7 April 2026, a week after the noon rule took effect.

zdfheute, Apr 2026
0.5%

Government GDP forecast for 2026 in April, down from 1.0% in January.

Spring projection, 22 Apr 2026

The "noon rule" (KPAnG)

Verified fact Reiche proposed the Fuel Price Adjustment Act (Kraftstoffpreisanpassungsgesetz), modelled on Austria. Petrol stations may raise prices only once a day, at 12:00, but can cut them at any time. The Federal Cartel Office's powers were strengthened. The Bundestag passed it on 26 March 2026 and it took effect on 1 April 2026.

Criticism The motoring club ADAC and others said prices kept rising regardless.

"Tankrabatt 2.0"

Verified fact From 1 May to 30 June 2026 the energy tax on petrol and diesel was cut by 14.04 cents per litre, about 17 cents including VAT. The Monopolies Commission and the Federal Cartel Office found the cut was largely passed on to consumers. The government also released part of the strategic oil reserves in coordination with partner countries.

"With the fuel measures package and the energy emergency programme, we as the federal government reacted quickly and decisively to relieve citizens and our companies."

„Mit dem Kraftstoffmaßnahmenpaket und mit dem Energie-Sofortprogramm haben wir als Bundesregierung schnell und entschlossen reagiert, um die Bürger und unsere Unternehmen zu entlasten.“

Katherina Reiche presenting the spring projection, 22 April 2026 (Federal Government)
Grid resilience

Resilience in the grid

Security of supply is also a question of whether electricity can reach consumers. In 2025 the Bundesnetzagentur approved about 2,000 km of transmission lines, and all four large north–south direct-current corridors are now fully approved; SuedLink is due to be connected by 2028. Until those lines run, grid operators must curtail wind in the north and start plants in the south to keep the system stable (redispatch). The ten-point plan's call for a "Netzampel" (grid traffic light), flexible demand and a faster smart-meter rollout – under 3 per cent of meters in 2025 – is aimed at the same problem from the demand side.

Grids and networks in detail

Ukraine

Energy support for Ukraine

Verified fact On 24 October 2025 Reiche travelled to Kyiv to discuss repairs to Ukraine's energy grid and defence cooperation. In early October 2026 she was again in Ukraine, where reports said she discussed anti-corruption with President Zelenskyy.

"Ukraine faces its fourth winter of war and Russia is intensifying its attacks on Ukraine's energy supply. This puts electricity and heating provision in the winter in grave danger."

Katherina Reiche in Kyiv, 24 October 2025. English as reported in wire copy; German original not found.

International energy policy